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The Role and Performance of Independent Regulatory 
Agencies in Post-Crisis Greece 
 
Manto Lampropoulou* and Stella Ladi† 
 
ABSTRACT  
The importance of independent agencies aiming to regulate the market has increased during 
the crisis years. Existing agencies such as the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post 
Commission, the Regulatory Authority for Energy and the Hellenic Competition Committee 
have been strengthened while new ones such as the Regulatory Authority for Railways and 
the Regulatory Authority for Ports have been introduced. This has been the result of the 
increased pressure for privatizations and the liberalization of sectors of the economy 
(network industries) which used to be dominated by state-owned enterprises (DEKO). This 
paper aims to map the landscape of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in Greece and to 
provide an assessment their performance up to now. 
Keywords: Independent regulatory agencies, regulatory reform, network industries, 
regulatory performance, Greece. 
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1. Introduction  
The economic adjustment programmes of Greece (2010-2018) have brought about a range of 
sweeping changes in major economic sectors and at various levels of the state apparatus. A 
key reform area has been the network industries, where the tone was set by privatization and 
liberalization. In view of the new or ongoing reforms regarding the opening of state 
monopolies to competition and the sale of state assets to private investors, a critical 
prerequisite for their implementation and support has been the existence of strong regulators 
in areas that were detached from direct state ownership and control. The agreements signed 
between the Greek governments and the country’s lenders (Memoranda of Understanding - 
MoUs) included several provisions and measures aiming at strengthening the role of 
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). MoUs generated strong pressure for the creation of 
new IRAs – for instance in the transport and water sectors and the strengthening of existing 
ones – such as the communications and energy regulators. Within the framework of policy 
conditionality, the landscape of IRAs in Greece has undergone major transformations, 
indicating a critical stage in the evolution of the domestic regulatory institutions.  
This paper aims to map the current landscape of IRAs and to provide a preliminary evaluation 
of their role and performance as market regulators. We seek to address two main questions: 
first, what was the impact of the crisis on the role, number and powers IRAs? Second, what is 
the current role and mission of IRAs and how do they perform as economic-market regulators 
in the new policy environment that created the crisis? In line with these questions, we 
investigate the rationale for the reform of IRAs and the institutional and regulatory 
adjustments that were introduced during the crisis, as well as the outcomes of IRAs in terms 
of market regulation. An additional research question to be addressed is the actual 
synchronisation of market reform policies (privatisation and liberalisation) with the required 
adjustments of the regulatory function via the reform of IRAs.  
The analysis draws on existing theory, but is mainly oriented toward an empirical mapping of 
the above issues. Along with the relevant literature, the paper is based on empirical data that 
was collected through personal interviews with IRAs’ members. For the assessment of IRAs’ 
performance, we use the OECD Performance Assessment Framework for Economic 
Regulators and evidence from available utilities market indicators. The paper is divided into 
three sections. In Section 1, the theoretical background on regulatory agencies is introduced 
in relation to the effect of the Eurozone crisis and the performance of IRAs. Section 2 describes 
the evolution of IRAs in Greece from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period. In Section 3, the 
role and performance of IRAs are assessed based on evidence on the quality of regulation and 
the operation of the markets. 
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1.1 Theory & analytical framework 
1.1.1 Market regulation via ‘agencification’ 
The devolution of regulatory powers from central ministerial departments to independent 
agencies is a form of structural and functional decentralisation that falls within the wave of 
‘agencification’ in public administration. Agencification has been a key trend of administrative 
reforms that have spread at a global scale (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006) and affected 
European countries since the 1980s (Gualmini, 2008: 77-80). This type of governance, via non-
majoritarian institutions (Thatcher & Sweet, 2002), represents an alternative to the 
traditional, multi-functional and integrated bureaucratic organizations and is mostly (but not 
solely) linked with NPM-type reforms (Pollitt et al., 2001; Scott, 2014).  
The rationale for the creation of independent agencies focuses primarily on the advantages 
of the delegation of powers for overcoming (or by-passing) the weaknesses of traditional, 
centralized and vertically-integrated bureaucracies. In short, independent agencies aim at 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government bodies, their flexibility and ability 
to adjust to changing and complex environments, the credibility and continuity of public 
policies and the quality of their outcomes for the citizens (Majone 1994; OECD, 2002: 14-15; 
Shick, 2002; Maggetti 2012; Vibert, 2016: 3-4). However, IRAs have been criticized for their 
vague democratic accountability and legitimacy (Majone, 1999; Thatcher & Sweet, 2002), the 
risk of weakening policy coherence and co-ordination (Schick, 2002: 33) and the possibility of 
‘regulatory capture3’ (Stigler, 1971). 
A distinct sub-category of independent agencies are the authorities for market regulation, 
which is the topic of this paper4. Focusing on the rationale for market-economic regulation, 
agencification has been directly linked with the emergence and growth of the regulatory state 
(Majone, 1994; Norton, 2004; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005, 2006; Scott, 2014). The latter has 
been considered as the successor of the ‘positive’ welfare state and has led to new modes 
and tools of government intervention (Majone, 1997; Thatcher, 2002; Braithwaite, 2008). This 
shift has been expressed via the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory powers of 
the state and the respective weakening of direct government intervention in terms of public 
production and provision. Accordingly, a new policy mix defined by liberalization, 
privatization and (re)regulation has brought about large-scale transformations and called for 
new reform and regulatory instruments (Levi-Faur, 2003, 2004; Gilardi, 2008; Scott, 2008; 
Florio, 2017).  
The creation of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) came largely as a response to policy 
issues that derived from the privatisation and liberalisation of state monopolies (Córdova-
Novion & Hanlon, 2002: 71-72). In a privatised industry, an independent regulator is needed 
in order to protect the consumer against the abuse of monopoly power and to prevent 
                                                     
3 Regulatory capture occurs when the regulators are captured by the regulated industries and the operation of 
IRAs deviates from serving the public interest to the promotion of the interests of market industries. 
4 Regulatory authorities can be categorized in competition, utility and financial regulators (Thatcher 2002: 954). 
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economic inefficiencies of monopoly operations. In a liberalised market, the regulator must 
be distinct from the state, as the latter may act in favour of a state-owned or state-controlled 
enterprise, in order to ensure the equal treatment of the incumbent firms and new entrants. 
IRAs were a key requirement of this new policy environment. Other reasons point out the 
need for specialized technical and scientific knowledge in complex policy areas that cannot 
be managed by traditional ministerial bureaucracies (OECD, 2002: 14). In addition, legal 
obligations deriving from EU membership has been a key factor for the creation of 
independent regulatory entities in member states (Norton, 2004: 787). In Greece, the 
creation of IRAs was basically a response to all of the above factors. The policy mix has been 
composed of liberalisation, privatisation and Europeanization. These processes were 
accelerated and intensified after the outbreak of the crisis in late 2009.  
Similarly, to the variety of institutional, legal and organisational forms of agencies (Pollit et al. 
2001; OECD, 2002; Thatcher, 2002; Christensen, T. & Lægreid, 2005; Yeung, 2010; Verhoest 
et al., 2012), sectoral regulators and competition authorities significantly vary across and 
within countries (Córdova-Novion & Hanlon, 2002: 66-70). In this paper, based on Thatcher’s 
work (2005: 352), a set of minimum prerequisites defining IRAs includes: the existence of 
agencies’ own powers and responsibilities (provided by public law), the separation of their 
organizational structure from the ministers and their independence in terms of not being 
directly elected or managed by elected officials. These three criteria are met by all IRAs under 
study here. 
 
1.1.2 The Eurozone crisis and IRAs’ reform  
In the EU, most IRAs were created after the abolition of state monopolies in network 
industries in response to the obligations deriving from the sectoral Directives since the late 
1980s. In many cases of unsatisfactory performance of IRAs, the intervention of EU 
institutions was deemed necessary in order to correct the observed weaknesses (CERRE, 
2014: 17). In the early stages of markets’ integration, external involvements from the EU level 
were usually related to delays in the transposition of the EU directives into national law 
(Berglund, 2009; Thomas, 2018). Greek IRAs have often invoked interventions or 
recommendations from the EU level, particularly regarding the energy sector5 (Berglund et 
al. 2006; Nabitz and Hirzelb, 2019). At this time, the creation and operation of IRAs was mainly 
associated with the acceleration of the EU driven liberalisation process and the opening of 
markets to competition. The approach on IRAs seems to have changed since the outbreak of 
the Eurozone crisis. Similar patterns were adopted across countries that were more severely 
hit by the crisis, such as the countries of the southern European periphery. The reforms that 
were initiated as a response to the economic adjustment programmes highlighted similar 
problems, such as the weak role and the insufficient degree of independence of IRAs and 
suggested similar remedies, mainly the strengthening of IRAs’ role, autonomy and powers. 
                                                     
5 See also European Commission - Press release “Commission refers Greece to Court and gives Germany a final 
warning regarding the transposition of the Energy Efficiency Directive” (Brussels, 18 June 2015). 
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However, a critical shift has been the emergence of a new rationale for IRAs’ reform, which 
was linked to the fiscal consolidation process and/or policy conditionality (see section 2ii).  
Particular emphasis was placed on the guarantee that the Portuguese Competition Authority 
has sufficient and stable financial means in order to operate in an effective and sustained way 
and that the National Regulator Authorities (NRA) have the necessary independence and 
resources to exercise their responsibilities6. In the course of the Economic Adjustment 
Programme, actions were taken in order to reinforce the independence and autonomy of 
national regulatory authorities (including energy, communications and aviation) and the 
Competition Authority7. In the transport sector, a new agency was established (Authority for 
Mobility and Transport - AMT, 2014), which replaced the three former transport regulators in 
rail, ports and road sectors. As in the Greek case, the need for strengthening the competences 
and safeguarding sufficient autonomy, independence and authority of the regulator was 
stressed8. 
In Spain, IRAs were not part of the financial assistance agreement (2012). However, the 
reform of the institutional framework for the competition policy and regulatory structures 
was among the measures that were included in the National Reform Programme 2012 (Xifré, 
2014: 11). Important changes occurred during the crisis (Espín and Sitges, 2017): on June 
2013, the National Commission on Markets and Competition (NCMC) was established9 as a 
successor of the National Regulatory Authority, comprising most regulatory bodies in network 
industries10. As in the Greek and the Portuguese cases, this reform aimed primarily at 
guaranteeing the independence of IRAs and to restrict opportunities for political interference, 
also supporting the compliance of the country with the EU framework. In particular, NCMC 
was expected to help the Spanish economy to overcome the crisis and to reignite growth 
(Xifré, 2014: 1). 
Overall, in the context of the Eurozone crisis IRA’s reform seems to have followed a common 
pattern. The broader rationale for reform was the (expected) contribution of IRAs in boosting 
competition and economic growth and supporting the fiscal-economic recovery. The major 
weaknesses pointed out the inefficient performance of existing (pre-crisis) regulatory 
structures and the need for strengthening their role, autonomy and competences. IRAs’ 
reform was associated with broader market reforms, such as liberalization and privatisation 
and macro-economic stability. The latter was a new element in the domestic IRAs’ policy 
agendas.  
In all three countries, the Eurozone crisis created pressure for the acceleration or completion 
of already pending EU driven reforms that were not directly associated with the crisis. In this 
respect, notwithstanding the differences in the scale and pace of the reforms, Greece was not 
                                                     
6 Portugal - Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, 17 May 2011, p. 35. 
7 European Commission (2014). The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal 2011-2014, p. 67. 
8 European Commission (2014). The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal 2011-2014, p. 66. 
9 Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (CNMC) (Act No. 3/2013). 
10 National Energy Commission; National Antitrust Commission; Telecommunications Market Commission; Rail 
Regulation Committee; Airport Economic Regulation Commission; National Postal Industry Commission. 
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an exception to the policy responses to the crisis that reflected a broader agenda for utilities 
markets and (re-)entered domestic policy programmes via the Eurozone crisis. At the same 
time, along with the typical legitimacy problems of IRAs, the involvement and motives of 
supranational actors in domestic policies and decision-making raised additional legitimacy 
issues and affected the ownership of the reforms which, in the case of Greece, was very low. 
As a result, as it will be showed in the following analysis, in some cases the adjustments 
brought about only surface changes to the legislative framework in order to comply with the 
external obligations. 
 
1.1.3 Measuring IRAs’ performance 
The literature on IRAs’ performance covers a wide range of indicators. The meaning, tools and 
evaluation criteria of performance vary significantly, as well as the type, methods and 
unit/levels of analysis, depending on the approach adopted (Brown et al., 2006). A key starting 
point for the assessment is defined by the aims and expected outcomes of IRAs. In this 
respect, performance is directly linked with the goals and the mission of IRAs (Pollitt & Talbot, 
2004: 14-18), measuring the degree to which these goals have been achieved. A strand of the 
literature approaches IRAs’ performance in an indirect way, linking agency performance with 
indicators of the agencies’ external environment, i.e. market, industry and consumers. Many 
scholars focus primarily on market, sector or industry performance and the quality of the 
regulatory environment (Joskow, 2005) or, generally, the regulatory system (Brown et al., 
2006). Indicators assessing the effectiveness of market regulation include market 
performance, price and quality of services/products and market competition (Pollitt & Talbot, 
2004; Verhoest et al., 2009).  
Other studies measure the quality of services and service delivery (Arblaster and Bolt, 1999; 
European Commission, 2007; CERRE, 2014; Waddams and Deller, 2015) or assess the quality 
of regulation in relation to market performance and consumer’s satisfaction (Fiorio & Florio, 
2009; Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes, 2010). IRAs’ performance is also often associated with the 
degree of their independence. With a focus on EU countries, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2012: 34-
41) show that agency independence affects market performance; Cambini and Rondi (2011) 
find that there is a positive correlation between IRAs and investment decisions; Gilardi and 
Servalli (2011) find a causal link between the regulator’s independence and improved 
regulatory outcomes. Hanretty et al. (2012) argue that independence and accountability are 
positively linked with the (perceived) quality of the regulators. Verhoest et al. 2004, based on 
existing studies, posit that in some cases agency autonomy is positively correlated with 
technical efficiency, but overall its impact on performance is differentiated or even 
controversial.  
All in all, IRAs’ performance depends on broader political, economic and institutional factors 
and is highly context-dependent. Along with the technical and market criteria, the 
performance of regulators reflects the embeddedness (or not) of certain good regulation 
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principles such as transparency, non-discrimination and accountability (OECD, 2008, 2014a, 
2016) and the overall quality of the agencies’ governance methods (OECD, 2014b: 107). The 
performance of IRAs is also specified and associated with particular internal variables, such 
as the professional standards and remunerations of IRAs’ members (Navarro, 1982).  
This paper draws primarily on the OECD Performance Assessment Framework for Economic 
Regulators (PAFER) for the assessment of IRAs’ performance in Greece (section 3). PAFER 
offers an inclusive set of general indicators that cover most of the internal and external 
variables of IRAs’ operation and fit well with the features of the Greek IRAs and the purpose 
of the paper. According to this tool, the performance of IRAs is measured in relation to: (i) 
strategic objectives, (ii) input, (iii) process, and (iv) output and outcome, as presented in 
Annex I. These indicators allow to assess many aspects of IRAs’ performance as well as to 
discern their respective strengths and weaknesses in different areas. In the absence of 
available data measuring directly the performance of the domestic IRAs our analysis is based 
on existing market indicators, reports and data collected through interviews with members 
of IRAs and focus-groups. 
 
2. IRAs in Greece 
2.1 The landscape of IRAs before the crisis 
IRAs in Greece were created mostly as a response to the requirements of the single market 
and the EU-driven liberalization of economic sectors, such as network industries. In the EU, 
IRAs for market competition were strengthened during the 1980s and the 1990s, signifying a 
critical change of the traditional regulation paradigm of which the dominant actors were 
governments and regulatees (Thatcher, 2005: 347). Greek independent authorities were 
created and evolved in line with the European trends and external commitments (Georgantas, 
2003). Given that the Greek administrative system has been characterized by a high degree 
of centralization and concentration, the delegation of power to independent entities signified 
a critical aspect of the broader modernization process of public administration (Spanou, 2008: 
161; Ladi, 2014: 190). 
Greek IRAs are characterized by certain diversity (Galanis, 2018); their status, type and powers 
vary across sectors. Thus, a uniform market regulation agency pattern does not exist. In a 
historical perspective, the authority for the protection of competition was the first quasi-
autonomous authority that was established in 197711. Since the mid-1990s, its independency 
and competences were gradually strengthened12 and the Hellenic Competition Commission 
(HCC) took the typical form of an independent agency. Sectoral regulatory agencies were 
created during the 1990s in parallel with the privatization and liberalization of utilities sectors 
and the harmonization of the domestic regulatory framework with the EU legislation. The 
                                                     
11 Law 703/1977. 
12 Laws 2296/1995, 2837/2000 and 3373/2005.  
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regulatory authority for telecommunications and posts13 (EETT) was established in 199214, at 
the beginning of the process of market liberalization. Its competences were reinforced and 
expanded in the following decades15. The national regulator for energy (RAE) was established 
at the end of the 1990s16, as a result of the adjustments required by the EU market 
liberalization Directives.  
By the end of the 2000s, these new entities had become an integral part of the domestic 
administrative system and a critical factor for its Europeanization and modernization. While 
regulatory authorities are not constitutionally guaranteed, they enjoy considerable financial 
and administrative independence. The existing political and bureaucratic structures initially 
faced new agencies with skepticism and were reluctant to delegate powers and 
responsibilities. Most agencies, especially during the early stages of their operation, faced 
several problems regarding their powers, independence and resources (Alexopoulos et al., 
2009) that undermined their regulatory capacity and performance. These weaknesses were 
well recognized before the eruption of the crisis and were further aggravated due to the 
delayed adjustment of the markets and the regulatory framework. While the need to 
complete the required market reforms and to strengthen the role of the regulatory 
authorities had been stressed by the EU, it was the economic adjustment programmes that 
triggered more drastic and radical measures that progressed the pending or delayed reforms. 
 
2.2 IRAs during the crisis 
2.2.1 Overview 
Since the outbreak of the Greek crisis in late 2009, the landscape of regulatory agencies has 
undergone major transformations. The role of IRAs was notably upgraded, and they were 
linked with key reforms that were included in the MoUs, such as the liberalization of energy 
and transport sectors and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Existing IRAs’ powers 
and competences were expanded and their role in policy-making and implementation was 
strengthened. At the same time, the legislative framework for the creation of new IRAs was 
adopted, namely the Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS, 2010), the Regulatory Authority 
for Passenger Transport (RAEM, 2013) and the Regulatory Authority for Ports (RAL, 2013 / 
2016). In addition, the Special Secretariat for Water was transformed to a semi-independent 
structure17 within the Ministry of Environment and Energy. 
Along with the (pending) requirements of the single market and the liberalization process, a 
critical factor underlying the empowerment of IRAs in the course of the economic adjustment 
                                                     
13 Initially named Hellenic Telecommunications Committee (EET, 1992) and since 1998 Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT). 
14 Law 2075/1992. 
15 Law 2668/1998, Act 2867/2000 and Law 3431/2006. 
16 Regulatory Authority for Energy - Law 2773/1999. 
17 A provision for a separate budget was included in the Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 
2016). 
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programmes was the policy conditionality linking the required reforms with the loan’s 
disbursement (Featherstone, 2015; Spanou, 2018). The latter created a new policy 
environment. The strong external pressure to de-politicise several functions of the domestic 
administrative system, especially in MoU-related areas – due to the low trust of the country’s 
creditors vis-a-vis the Greek governments – enabled and supported the creation of 
independent entities that operate ‘at arm’s length’ from the state. This attempted de-
politicisation through agencification18 was observed not only at the level of regulatory 
agencies, but affected many central administrative structures and implied a clearer division 
between the political and the administrative sphere (Lampropoulou & Oikonomou, 2018).  
 
2.2.2 MoUs & Reform Programmes 
The provisions and obligations that were included in the MoUs and the domestic reform 
programmes include a range of measures targeting both markets and IRAs: 
During the 1st programme (2010), emphasis was placed on the strengthening of the role, 
competences and independence of the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC). In line with 
the Memorandum obligations19, domestic legislation provided for the empowerment of HCC 
and a new institutional framework was adopted20 – ensuring its independence, effectiveness, 
accountability and the continuity of its board21. Detailed measures were also set out for the 
reform of the energy and transport sectors, including the gradual liberalization of markets 
and the strengthening of the regulators22. Among them, the reinforcement of the 
independence of the Regulatory Authority for Energy – with reference to the nomination of 
board budget and personnel – was a key action23. In light of these requirements, new 
legislation was passed that changed and empowered the role of RAE24. 
The 2nd programme (2012) included deeper and more detailed provisions for IRAs. An 
upgrading of HCC’s role in certain ongoing reforms was observed, such as in regulated 
professions, fuel sector and product markets25. Regarding sectoral regulators, in the 2nd MoU 
a critical change regarding the linkage of IRAs with the envisaged reforms was the shift of the 
focus from liberalization to privatization. The role of IRAs was more directly linked with the 
use and management of state assets26, along with the opening of the markets to competition. 
IRAs were a necessary precondition for the proper regulation of markets under privatization: 
                                                     
18 From an institutional perspective, IRAs represent a critical aspect of ‘functional decentralization’ reforms 
(Spanou, 2008: 161). 
19 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality (May 2010), pp. 11, 26. 
20 Law 3959/2011 (amended by Laws 4013/2011, 4072/2012, 4364/2016 and 4389/2016). 
21 Law 3845/2010, p. 1368; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011), p. 67. 
22 Law 3845/2010, p. 1347. 
23 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on specific economic policy conditionality (May 2010), p. 12, 26; Law 
3845/2010, p. 1369; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011), p. 71. 
24 Laws 3851/2010 & 4001/2011. 
25 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Fourth review (July 2011). 
26 Greece: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (March 2012), ch. D, par. 24; Law 4046/2012, p. 762. 
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for instance, regarding ports and gas sectors27. The agreed measures covered sectors with 
limited scope for competition such as ports, water, airports and motorways, and differed from 
the case of telecommunications and energy market reforms that were mainly driven by the 
liberalization process. The establishment and the strengthening of the effectiveness and 
autonomy of port, rail and water regulating authorities were actions of major importance28. 
In the e-communications sector, the MoU II extended the role of the Hellenic 
Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT) as a one-stop shop for the licensing of 
antennae and base stations29. 
In the 3rd programme (2015), the above reforms progressed and were further specified. The 
need to strengthen the institutional, financial and functional independence and effectiveness 
of existing IRAs such as the HCC and RAE was stressed, along with measures aiming at 
enhancing the role, functionality and powers of the newly established regulatory structures 
for water and ports30. Special emphasis was placed on the operation, competences and 
autonomy of the Special Secretariat for Water31. A critical new element that was included in 
the 3rd MoU is that, for the first time, a unified approach on independent agencies was 
introduced. In light of the relevant provisions, the Supplemental MoU (2017) emphasized the 
need to review and simplify the existing legislative framework and to define a common set of 
rules that would apply horizontally to all independent agencies32. In line with the envisaged 
horizontal legislation, the main principles for HCC, RAE and RAEM are expected to be further 
defined33. Up to date, a revised partial version of the draft law has been submitted by the 
Greek authorities and was under consultation with the EU institutions, leading to a revised 
report on June 201834. 
After the conclusion of the adjustment programmes in August 2018, the continuity and 
completion of these reforms was agreed, and their progress is being monitored. Regarding 
the review of the legal framework for independent authorities, priority areas have been the 
legislation for RAE and RAEM35 as well as the further increase of the independence of RAE in 
decision-making and its overall capacity36. 
 
                                                     
27 The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fourth Review (April 2014), p. 3. 
28 The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Fourth Review (April 2014), pp. 26-27, 76-77, 121. 
29 Greece: Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality (March 2012), (Growth-
Enhancing Structural Reforms). 
30 Greece - Memorandum of Understanding for a three-year ESM programme (August 2015), pp. 24, 27; Law 
4336, p. 1027; Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016), p. 41. 
31 Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016), p. 32; Compliance Report - ESM Stability 
Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 29, 61-62. 
32 Greece - Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding (June 2016) pp. 2, 40-41. 
33 Compliance Report - ESM Stability Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 72-73. 
34 Compliance Report - ESM Stability Support Programme for Greece - Fourth Review (July 2018), pp. 72-73. 
35 Enhanced Surveillance Report. Greece, November 2018 (p. 63). 
36 Enhanced Surveillance Report. Greece, June 2019, p. 59. 
 
 
10 
2.3 State of play: The post-crisis landscape of IRAs 
The current landscape of IRAs is characterized by a notable increase in their number, 
compared with the pre-crisis period, and the strengthening of their role and powers in policy-
making and implementation. The reforms are still in progress and both new and old agencies 
are adjusting to new requirements under the Europeanization, liberalization and privatization 
process. Existing agencies are embedding their new powers, functions and responsibilities, 
while the newly created agencies are in the process of establishing their authority and 
defining their role in the new market environment.  
In the present circumstances, according to existing legislation, the IRAs for market regulation 
are the following: 
 The Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC, 1977) is responsible for the enforcement 
of the national and EU competition rules. The HCC has enforcement and consultative 
powers and its role is critical in the identification and removal of barriers to 
competition as well as in the area of collusive practices/cartels, abuses of dominance 
and merger controls. It has horizontal competences for market competition, and it 
collaborates with the sectoral regulatory authorities. HCC enjoys procedural, decision-
making and financial autonomy. 
 The Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT, 1992) is the competent 
competition authority in the telecommunications and post markets. EETT is 
responsible for the monitoring, regulation and supervision of electronic 
communications (fixed / mobile telephony, wireless communications and Internet) 
and postal services markets (postal / courier service provision). The authority enjoys 
administrative and financial independence. 
 The Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE, 1999) is responsible for the operation of the 
domestic energy market (electricity, natural gas, oil products, renewable energy 
sources, cogeneration of electricity and heat, etc.). RAE is financially and 
administratively independent and its main duties include the monitoring of all 
subsectors of the market and the activity of the licensees, the imposition of financial 
sanctions, arbitration and dispute settlement. RAE also has an advisory role and 
participates in the pre-parliamentary process of the legislation that applies to the 
energy sector.  
 The Regulatory Authority for Railways (RAS, 2010) monitors the operation of the rail 
transport sector and aims at ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access to the railway 
network and services. The previous regulating body was the National Council of 
Railways, which was established in 2008. RAS is functionally, administratively and 
financially independent. 
 The Regulatory Authority for Passenger Transport (RAEM, 2013) is the competent 
body for the regulation of the inter-city transports. Its main mission is to ensure the 
non-discriminatory and continuous provision of inter-city transport services across the 
country. RAEM is administratively and operationally independent and enjoys financial 
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autonomy. However, up to date, RAEM remains practically inactive, as its operation 
has not begun37. 
 The Regulatory Authority for Ports (RAL, 2013 / 2016) is responsible for the monitoring 
of the ports and the relative procedures and services. Initially RAL was established as 
a quasi-independent public service (2013), overseen by the Ministry of Shipping and 
Island Policy. Three years later (2016) RAL was transformed into an independent 
regulatory authority. RAL is currently responsible to supervise and ensure the legality 
of the relation between the public and private bodies of the national port system, 
especially regarding the implementation of the competition policy. 
 The Civil Aviation Authority (APA, 2016) is competent for the regulation and 
supervision of the operation of civil aviation and the implementation of the legal 
framework, international conventions and national legislation. APA is separate from 
the existing Civil Aviation Authority (YPA)38 and is supervised by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Transport. 
 The Special Secretariat for Water (SSW, 2016) is the competent structure for the 
regulation of the water sector. SSW is a specific case of regulatory body that does not 
typically constitute an independent authority, as is a distinct unit of the Ministry of 
Energy and Environment, but since 2016 operates under a special framework that 
guarantees a certain degree of autonomy (the SMoU mentioned the need for SSW to 
have its own budget). 
Table 1 summarizes the existing IRAs in network industries and the type / regime of the 
respective markets and sectors. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. IRAs & markets 
Sector Market Regulator 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
& POSTS 
Liberalized Hellenic 
Telecommunications and 
Post Commission (EETT) 
                                                     
37 The members of RAEM took office in September 2014. However, shortly after their appointment, one member 
resigned, and the authority could not operate. In addition, the necessary decisions for its funding and staffing 
have not been issued by the competent Minister. More than five years after the creation of RAEM the term of 
office of its members has expired without any contact or collaboration between them and the competent 
Minister at any time during their term or thereafter. 
38 See Law 4427/2016 (codified). The operation of the Authority has been characterised by important delays, 
especially regarding the division of competences between APA and YPA (the required presidential decrees were 
issued 2 years after the establishment of APA). 
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Telecommunications Oligopoly: 4 fixed and 
4 mobile tel. 
providers39 
 
Posts Oligopoly: 10 
providers40 
 
   
ENERGY Liberalized (ongoing) Regulatory Authority for 
Energy (RAE) 
Electricity  Oligopoly: 25 
providers41 
 
Gas Oligopoly: 21 
providers42 
 
   
TRANSPORT   
Railways Liberalized  
Oligopoly: 5 
companies 
Regulatory Authority for 
Railways (RAS) 
Urban transportation 
(Athens & Thessaloniki)  
Μonopoly [Athens Public Transport 
Organization (OASA S.A.),  
Transport Authority of 
Thessaloniki S.A. 
(OSΕTH)]43 
Inter-city transport Quasi-liberalized 
[monopoly / line (62 
KTEL)] 
Regulatory Authority for 
Passenger Transport 
(RAEM) 
Marines/ports  Quasi-liberalized 
(Concessions44 and / 
or privatization45)  
Regulatory Authority for 
Ports (RAL) 
Airports Quasi-liberalized 
(Concessions) 
Civil Aviation Authority 
(APA) 
   
WATER & SEWERAGE 
SERVICES 
Non-liberalized 
Monopoly 
Special Secretariat for 
Water (SSW)46 
   
                                                     
39 Source: Interviews and EETT, Market Review of Electronic Communications & Postal Services 2017. 
40 Source: EETT, Market Review of Electronic Communications & Postal Services 2017. 
41 Source: DEDDIE data (Dec. 2018). 
42 Source: data from Natural Gas Distribution Companies – EDAs (Attica, Thess, DEDA) (Nov. 2018). 
43 These entities are not IRAs according to our definition; however, they are responsible for the monitoring of 
the respective sectors and are supervised by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. 
44 Regional ports. 
45 Piraeus Port Authority S.A. (OLP) and Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A. (OLTH). 
46 Structure within the Ministry of Environment and Energy. 
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INTER-SECTORAL  
HORIZONTAL 
COMPETENCES  
(various regimes) Hellenic Competition 
Committee (HCC) 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
From this overview, a set of common features, as well as certain differences, can be traced 
among existing IRAs – as presented in Table 2. Regarding the similarities, the creation of IRAs 
in all cases has been the result of external pressures and came as a response to the single 
market requirements and the adjustment of the domestic framework to EU legislation 
(sectoral Directives). In most cases, especially in the early stages of their operation, IRAs faced 
several problems of limited powers, inadequate resources, political interferences and 
understaffing. IRAs are characterized by several differences with reference to their powers, 
institutional features, resources and degree of independence. 
Table 2. Similarities and differences among IRAs 
Similarities Differences 
Rationale:  
adjustment to 
external 
requirements 
 common market  
 debt crisis 
 economic 
adjustment 
Supranational 
policy 
context  
(EU 
Directives, 
MOU) 
 Powers 
 Institutional 
features 
 Degree of 
independence 
 Resources 
Domestic 
policy context 
(institutional – 
regulatory 
framework) 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
During the economic adjustment programmes IRAs were part (and prerequisite) of key 
reforms in the utilities sector. The strengthening of existing IRAs and the creation of new ones 
was the combined effect of the acceleration of pending (delayed) reforms and new 
commitments were undertaken under the Memoranda in the energy, telecoms, transport and 
other sectors. The pre-crisis IRAs have been mostly oriented towards the liberalization of the 
markets, while the post crisis (new) IRAs seem to have been more closely linked with the 
privatization programme (Table 3). Accordingly, the type and the degree of competition of 
the respective markets vary. 
 
Table 3. IRAs, markets and policy orientation 
 Regulated 
oligopolies 
Regulated 
monopolies 
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Liberalization – 
Europeanization 
oriented 
RAE 
EETT 
                       
HCC 
 
SSW 
Privatization 
oriented 
 APA 
RAS 
RAL  
RAEM 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
 
3. The Question of IRAs’ Performance 
3.1 Quality of regulation and the insiders’ view. 
This section makes a preliminary assessment of IRAs’ performance, based on the existing 
legislation and the views of the regulators and the industry. We mainly focus on sectoral 
regulators47, thus the HCC is not included, due to its horizontal competences. For EETT, RAEM, 
RAL and RAS we draw on information that was gathered via communication or personal 
interviews with their members and staff48. For RAE, we combined existing literature and 
findings from a focus group on Energy Policy in Greece that was held in 201649. We also used 
data from the annual reports of IRAs and other official publications. For analytical reasons, 
we discern the pre-crisis and post-crisis IRAs. Our assessment is structured according to the 
OECD indicators that are presented in Annex I, namely: strategic objectives, inputs, process, 
outputs and outcomes of IRAs.  
 
3.1.1 Strategic Objectives 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
o In the telecommunications sector EETT’s powers have been gradually 
strengthened and the agency has established its role in the market. The 
institutional and regulatory framework is sufficient, but regular updates are 
necessary. As regards the relationship of EETT with the overseeing Ministry, its 
independence seems to have been established, also due to the technical 
knowledge that is needed for the regulation of the sector and the lack of 
expertise of the competent ministerial structures. In some cases, EETTs’ 
proposals have not been accepted by the Minister, mainly because of the 
                                                     
47 We have excluded from this assessment the water (SSW) and civil aviation (APA) authorities, as the respective 
markets are quite dissimilar to the other sectors under study.  
48 In total 9 semi-structured interviews / conversations with the heads and / or members and officials of EETT, 
RAS, RAL and RAEM. 
49 Available at 
http://www.ekke.gr/siemens/%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%97%CE%A1%CE%99%C
E%91%20%CE%94%CE%97%CE%9C%CE%9F%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3%20%CE%A0%CE%9F%CE%9B%
CE%99%CE%A4%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%97%CE%A3.pdf. 
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different prioritization of policy goals at this time. The managerial autonomy 
of EETT to a degree is guaranteed by the law and its members serve on a fixed-
term basis. The board of EETT is appointed by the overseeing Minister and the 
current management believes that there are not many interventions in the 
agency’s operation.  
o In the energy sector, RAE’s role still seems to be unclear, which largely reflects 
the ambivalence of the policymakers toward the delegation of powers from 
the central ministerial structure to the regulator. The need to strengthen its 
decision-making and regulatory competences has been stressed. 
 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o RAS has specified a set of strategic and sectoral objectives to be met (RAS, 
2018: 81-82). 
o RAL’s mandate is clearly defined and specified (RAS, 2018: 9-14), as well as the 
division of policy and regulatory responsibilities between RAL and the Ministry 
of Maritime and Insular Policy (Angelopoulos et al., 2019: 11-12). However, the 
objectives of RAL are mostly linked with technical and procedural 
competencies, on a short- or medium-term basis, and to a lesser extent include 
issues of a strategic character50. 
o RAEM’s goals, except for its founding law provisions, have not been specified 
in practice and in detail, due to the actual inactive status of the authority51. 
 
3.1.2 Inputs (role and independence of IRAs) 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
o In the telecommunications sector EETT’s powers have been gradually 
strengthened and the agency has established its role in the market. The 
institutional and regulatory framework is sufficient, but regular updates are 
necessary. As regards the relationship of EETT with the overseeing Ministry, its 
independence seems to have been established, also due to the technical 
knowledge that is needed for the regulation of the sector and the lack of 
expertise of the competent ministerial structures. In some cases, EETTs’ 
proposals have not been accepted by the Minister, mainly because of the 
different prioritization of policy goals at this time. The managerial autonomy 
of EETT to a degree is guaranteed by the law and its members serve on a fixed-
term basis. The board of EETT is appointed by the overseeing Minister and the 
current management believes that there are not many interventions in the 
agency’s operation.  
o In the energy sector, RAE’s role still seems to be unclear, which largely reflects 
the ambivalence of the policymakers toward the delegation of powers from 
                                                     
50 Besides, according to its founding law (4389/2016), RAL’s mission is to oversee and guarantee the legality of 
the contractual relationships between the public and the private stakeholders of the Greek port system, with 
emphasis on the implementation of the legislation. 
51 See previous section, footnote 37. 
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the central ministerial structure to the regulator. The need to strengthen its 
decision-making and regulatory competences has been stressed. 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o RAS does not have extensive powers regarding policy formulation and strategic 
issues, as the major policy decisions are made by the competent Minister. 
o RAL’s role mainly includes procedural issues and the implementation of the 
legislation in the Greek port system. Besides, the founding Law provides that 
its mission and its area of responsibility are in line with and restricted by the 
competences of the Ministry for Maritime and Insular Policy.   
o RAEM has no regulatory role, as its operation has not practically begun52. 
 
As regards the resources of IRAs: 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
o The budget and economic means of EETT are adequate, also given that an 
important source of revenue are the licensing rights. On the contrary, existing 
human resources are rather insufficient in relation to the needs of the 
authority. A major problem pointed out by all interviewed members and 
officials of EETT is the lack of personnel, especially regarding staff with 
specialized skills / knowledge of the telecoms sector. A precondition for 
attracting high-skilled personnel is the existence of incentives, which however 
is missing, mainly due to the fiscal restrictions that were imposed on public 
sector wages and remunerations.   
o RAE’s personnel is not sufficient. Less than half positions have been filled (74 
out of 157), and human resources need to be strengthened (RAE, 2018: 383-
386). The main reason for this understaffing is, as in the case of EETT, the weak 
motives to attract high-skilled personnel due to the restrictions of the public 
sector wage-scale. 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o RAL is not funded by the state budget, but its resources come from 
endowment fees and from revenue of port and other operators. The authority 
is understaffed, as only 9 out of 35 positions have been covered (RAL, 2019: 
44). 
o RAS is understaffed and mostly lacks specialized stuff in the area of its 
competences (RAS, 2018: 79).  
o RAEM has no resources at all, as the relevant decisions for its budget and for 
hiring personnel have not been issued by the competent Minister. 
 
3.1.3 Process 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
                                                     
52
 see footnote 37. 
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o EETT generally meets the goals of accurate, timely and effective intervention, 
also guaranteeing a certain degree of access and participation (via public 
consultations) of the stakeholders. 
o In the case of RAE, its operation is characterized to a large extent by heavy 
procedures and red-tape that hinders the speed, flexibility and effectiveness 
of the regulator. The publicity and participation requirements are met through 
the provided information and public consultations. 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o RAL and RAS operate mainly according to the rules and procedures of public 
(administrative) bodies. They both provide information on issues of the 
railways and port sectors and they held public consultations. 
o There is no data for RAEM, as the authority has not operated since its creation 
in 2013.  
 
3.1.4 Outputs 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
o The telecoms providers often challenge the decisions of EETT in courts. 
However, this tendency is gradually weakening and in most cases the courts 
do not overturn the decisions of the regulator but lower the fines or sanctions 
that are imposed by EETT.  
o RAE’s decisions often invoke the reaction of DEI, which is the incumbent of the 
energy sector. Most appeals to the courts usually refer to issues of 
compensation and financial disputes53. 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o A small percentage of RAL’s decisions are challenged in courts, around 10%54. 
o RAS’s decisions have been generally accepted, while several compensations 
have been paid by TRAINOSE to passengers. 
o There is no data for RAEM, as the authority has not operated since its creation 
in 2013.  
 
3.1.5 Outcomes 
 Pre-crisis IRAs: 
o In the telecoms market the degree of competition is estimated to be 
“satisfactory”. In the early stages of liberalization several problems arose due 
to the entry of providers that were not able to invest and stay in the market 
on a long-term basis. Gradually, these phenomena were weakened, and the 
market has balanced. In the current circumstances, the telecoms market 
operates as a regulated oligopoly. While there is competition among service 
                                                     
53 For instance, the compensation for the provision if Public Service Obligations (PSOs). 
54 For 2018, 4 out of 39 (RAL, 2018: 12]. 
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providers, the number of the active telecom companies is relatively low55. In 
addition, given that in countries with similar market structure and conditions 
competition is stronger, there is room for improvement56.  
o The energy market appears as a quite problematic case regarding market 
opening and competition. The process is rather slow and ineffective, for many 
reasons that range from the quality of policy formulation and implementation 
to structural constraints of the infrastructure and service delivery57. The 
absence of feedback mechanisms is a major weakness of the domestic energy 
policy in general and of RAE in particular58. 
 Post-crisis IRAs: 
o With regard to the RAS, compared to other EU countries, the number of rail 
operators in the Greek market is relatively low59. 
o The regulation of the port sector is complex, as it is a monopoly market 
(concession). Little evidence exists regarding the quality of its functions, while 
available studies mostly focus on the potential of the market, for instance 
regarding quality and safety systems (Chlomoudis et al., 2011), the port 
system60 etc. 
o RAEM is practically inactive, thus no outputs or outcomes have been delivered. 
 
3.2 Market indicators 
An additional external source for the evaluation of IRAs’ outcomes is the view of the 
consumers in network industries. Consumer Markets Scoreboard can be used as an indicator 
reflecting (among others) the quality of regulation in utilities markets. The components of the 
Market Performance Indicator index (MPI) include the respondents’ estimations and ratings 
with regard to five variables: Comparability, Trust, Problems & Detriment, Expectations and 
Choice. Their average scores since the beginning of the crisis are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Market Performance in regulated network industries 
 Average 
MPI 
2017- 
2015 
2017- 
2013 
2015- 
2013 
2013- 
2012 
2012- 
2011 
2011-
2010 
Country 
EU-28 
                                                     
55 Recently, telecoms providers were reduced from 5 to 4 and it is possible that further retraction will follow 
from 4 to 3 companies. 
56 However, a higher degree of competition does not solely depend on the regulator, but is also affected by other 
factors, such as the broader economic environment, the motives or the obstacles for investments, etc. 
57 See for instance (IEA, 2011; Polemis, 2014). 
58 See also Lampropoulou & Georgiou, 2017. 
59 RAS (2017). Annual Report, pp. 9-10.  
60 European Port Industry Sustainability Report 2017, pp. 8-9. 
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Fixed 
telephone 
services 
76.6 -3.9* -4.4* -0.4 +3.1* +1.0 -0.6 -0.6 
Postal 
Services 
81.6 +1.6 +1.5 +0.3 +2.1* -0.5 +0.7 +2.1* 
Internet 
provision 
75.2 -2.1* -3.3* -1.5 +0.9 +1.5 +3.7* -1.6* 
Train 
services 
78.2 +1.9* +4.0* +2.1* +4.5* -0.1 -2.6* +1.4* 
Water 
supply 
72.2 -1.3 +2.0 +2.8* +2.6* -2.2 -1.9 -4.9* 
Mobile 
telephone 
services 
75.9 +2.9* -2.7* -5.8* +3.4* -0.1 +1.0 -1.2 
Electricity 
services 
68.8 -0.8 +4.1* +5.5* +4.2* -6.8* -3.1* -7.5* 
Gas services 81.4 +3.9* +4.7* +0.3 +1.9 +2.9* -2.0* +2.1* 
          Source: EU - Consumer Markets Scoreboard 2018. 
 
The data shows that during the crisis period there have been some improvements, but most 
indicators have deteriorated. In the area of RAE, electricity services are among the three 
worst-performing markets and score below the EU-28 average. The same goes for Water 
supply. Internet provision and fixed telephone services have been deteriorating since 2013 
and are below the EU-28 average, implying the underperformance of the e-communications 
market. Postal services, Gas services and Train services have improved and score above the 
EU-28 average. However, these findings are partly controversial, to the extent that sectors 
that fall within the responsibility of the same regulator record both positive and negative 
scores, i.e. electricity and gas for RAE and fixed-telephone and postal services for EETT. They 
also show the limitations of these indicators for providing a clear relationship between market 
and regulatory performance, as the latter depends on a variety of factors. 
 
4. Conclusions  
This paper provided a mapping of the Greek IRAs, described the changes that occurred in the 
course of the recent economic adjustment programmes and attempted a first assessment of 
their performance up to now. Focusing on utilities markets, we discerned two distinct phases 
in the evolution of the competent regulatory institutions, i.e. the pre-crisis and the post-crisis 
IRAs. The debt crisis has triggered major transformations that required the strengthening of 
existing IRAs (HCC, EETT, RAE) and the creation of new ones (PAL, PAS, RAEM, APA) in order 
to support the implementation of the agreed reforms. A first critical finding is that the 
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rationale for IRAs’ reform differs between the pre and the post-crisis IRAs. In all cases, the 
main factor for reform has been an external pressure or obligation. However, in the pre-crisis 
IRAs the rationale for reform was clearly a pro-liberalization one, while in the case of the post-
crisis ones the reasons behind the creation of IRAs were directly related to the support and 
implementation of the privatization programme. Accordingly, the creation of the first 
generation of the Greek IRAs was driven by the single market prerequisites and the EU 
sectoral Directives, while the second generation of IRAs mostly came as a result of the 
conditionality and the need to comply with the MoU prerequisites.  
In the current circumstances the status of IRAs varies substantially regarding their 
institutional features, powers, resources and independence. Considerable differences were 
observed in the conditions and the operation of the respective markets. The pre-crisis IRAs 
operate in oligopoly markets after liberalization (telecommunications, energy), while the 
post-crisis ones in monopoly sectors in view of or after privatization (transport, water). Τhe 
performance of IRAs varies. Drawing on the indicators of the OECD Performance Assessment 
Framework for Economic Regulators, findings show that older and established agencies, such 
as EETT, seem to perform better than newly created ones that still lack powers and resources. 
RAS and RAL are in the process of establishing their role and functions and show good 
prospects but they both need institutional strengthening. RAE appears as a rather 
problematic case and its independence and powers need to be reinforced. Some progress in 
this direction was recorded during the economic adjustment programmes; however, the 
energy market still is characterised by major flaws and distortions of the competitive 
standards. Another problematic case is RAEM, which actually remains a ’ghost’ IRA, as it was 
legally established but has not (yet) operated. All IRAs under study face considerable 
difficulties in obtaining the necessary human resources especially regarding specialized 
personnel. In addition, the need for strengthening their powers as regards decision making 
competences has been stressed.  
These weaknesses reflect a broader flaw of IRAs that is linked with the suggested non-
synchronisation of the regulatory and policy framework. In short, the reason for the creation 
of IRAs has been often the formal-legislative compliance with the EU Directives and / or the 
Memorandum prerequisites in order to initiate the liberalisation and privatisation process, 
without having ensured sufficient competences and powers for the regulators. The lack of 
powers and resources is a key explanatory factor for the weaknesses and the 
underperformance of many IRAs. Nevertheless, the creation of IRAs has also led to several 
improvements, especially regarding the provided information and the transparency of the 
regulatory function. 
An interesting question, which however goes beyond the aims of the paper, concerns the 
interplay between the deep-rooted cultural norms and practices of the domestic political-
administrative system and the new standards, mainly the required depoliticisation of the 
regulatory institutions, which was externally imposed. The fact that most domestic IRAs were 
not created on national governments’ own initiative, but the latter were forced to do so by 
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the EU and/or the crisis pressure implies a prior (negative) reflex towards the delegation of 
powers from the central Ministries to semi-autonomous institutions. As discussed in section 
3.i.2, while IRAs’ independence was seemingly strengthened during the crisis, government 
interference in their operation remains a serious challenge, especially regarding informal 
political involvements.  
The findings of this paper are not conclusive, as in Greece no common framework or 
methodology for the measurement of IRAs’ performance exists. Moreover, many of them do 
not yet have an adequate operating experience. A critical issue that directly affects and will 
affect IRAs’ role in the future is the degree of their independence and their relationship with 
the political and administrative system. It remains to be seen whether and how the IRAs that 
were established under policy conditionality will find their pace and become a normalised 
part of the Greek administrative apparatus in the post-crisis context. 
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Annex.  
The OECD Performance Assessment Framework for Economic 
Regulators 
Strategic 
objectives 
Clearly identified 
role and 
objectives 
To identify the existence of a set 
of clearly identified objectives, 
targets, or goals that are aligned 
with the regulator’s functions and 
powers, which can inform the 
development of actionable 
performance indicators 
 
Input Efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
Input 
To determine the extent to which 
the regulator’s funding and 
staffing are aligned with the 
regulator’s objectives, targets or 
goals, and the regulator’s ability to 
manage financial and human 
resources autonomously and 
effectively 
e.g. Planned activities completed 
on time and on budget  
Process Quality of 
process for 
regulatory 
activity 
To assess the extent to which 
processes and the organisational 
management support the 
regulator’s performance 
e.g. Measurement of accuracy, 
timeliness, accessibility, 
participation, risk analysis, use of 
evidence) 
Output  Output from 
regulatory 
activity 
To identify the existence of a 
systematic assessment of the 
performance of the regulated 
entities, the impact of the 
regulator’s decisions and activities, 
and the extent to which these 
measurements are used 
appropriately 
e.g. Decisions taken which were 
upheld 
Outcome (i) Direct 
outcome / 
impact of 
outputs 
 
(ii) Wider 
outcomes 
Market structure  
(e.g. level of competition) 
Service and Infrastructure Quality  
(e.g. frequency and reliability of 
services to consumers, reliability 
and deployment of infrastructure) 
Consumer Welfare  
(e.g. ability of consumer to choose 
the service that best fits their 
preferences) 
Industry performance  
(e.g. revenues, profitability, 
investment) 
Source: OECD 2018: 86-87 & OECD, Driving Performance of Regulators:  
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/driving-performance-of-
regulators.htm 
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